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Abstract
This paper presents an approach for the selection of alternative architectures in a connected infrastructure system to
increase resilience of the overall infrastructure system. The paper begins with a description of resilience and critical
infrastructure, then summarizes existing approaches to resilience, and presents a fuzzy-rule based method of selecting
among alternative infrastructure architectures. This methodology includes considerations which are most important
when deciding on an approach to resilience. The paper concludes with a proposed approach which builds on existing
resilience architecting methods by integrating key system aspects using fuzzy memberships and fuzzy rule sets. This
novel approach aids the systems architect in considering resilience for the evaluation of architectures for adoption into
the ﬁnal system architecture.
c© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Resilience is an important attribute of critical infrastructure systems. The ability of these systems to
prevent, absorb, respond to, and recover from disruptive events is necessary in order that critical services are
performed. The architecture of these infrastructure systems changes over time as operators seek to improve
performance, manage system dynamics and increase service reliability. In systems engineering, the goal of
the architecting process is to reduce ambiguity and narrow the alternative solution space. In infrastructure
systems, ambiguity exists in the functional and logical interrelationships that exist across system boundaries,
and in the deﬁnition and application of resilience to these systems.
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This paper presents a methodology in which architectures can be assessed with respect to the contribu-
tion to overall system resilience. Alternative architecture changes can be characterized through a process of
evaluating existing infrastructure system attributes, identifying the system’s need for improved resilience,
evaluating the contribution of alternative architectures’ attributes to system resilience, and assessing the
performance of these alternatives using a fuzzy rule set to reduce the ambiguity of available alternatives.
1.1. Critical Infrastructure
Critical infrastructure is the set of systems, networks and assets that provide vital services and capabili-
ties to the served population [1]. Critical infrastructure is characterized by the functions of the segments that
comprise it and the interrelationships that exist across those segments. Table 1.1 provides a list of critical
infrastructure segments. Functional relationships spanning across the system become very complex when
considering a system beyond a few infrastructure segments. These systems, and their interdependencies, de-
velop in an ad hoc manner as the operating environment changes: components that comprise the system and
provide functionality mature, supporting processes change, and the nature of the functions being performed
expand to address new needs.
Table 1. DHS Critical Infrastructure Segments
Dams Agriculture and Food Defense Industrial Base
Water Postal and Shipping Critical Manufacturing
Energy Banking and Finance Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
Communication Transportation Systems Healthcare and Public Health
Chemical Government Facilities Commercial Facilities
Emergency Services National Monuments Information Technology
Critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to disruptive events. Disruptive events result from natural
or man-made disasters and other catastrophic events which degrade system performance with respect to a
Key Performance Indicator (KPI). These events may cause temporary or permanent damage to the system
[2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, the interdependencies that exist throughout the infrastructure add complexity to these
problems, as cascading impacts resulting in secondary and tertiary aﬀects are not necessarily well under-
stood. These critical infrastructure systems must be resilient to absorb the cascading impacts associated
with disruptive events.
1.2. Resilience
Across a broad set of disciplines, resilience has been generally deﬁned as the ability of a system to
respond to, adapt and recover from some disruptive event [5]. Interest in system resilience has grown as the
need for an understanding of how systems can respond and recover from disruptive events is increasingly
recognized [2, 5, 6]. Here, resilience is deﬁned as the ability of a system to resume normal function at a
performance level equal that which existed before a disruptive event. This deﬁnition encompasses a broad
range of systems and environments, and serves as a foundation for a number of commonly accepted metrics
for system resilience.
2. Current Approaches and Metrics for System Resilience
Existing approaches to characterizing resilience are varied [7, 8]. Much of the literature demonstrates a
model of resilience relative to a measure of system performance, or KPI. This type of model is represented
in Figure 1, and presents a performance curve for an infrastructure KPI, over time, depicting system perfor-
mance before, during and after a disruptive event. This model oﬀers a few key resilience measures that can
be applied broadly to infrastructures. The following metrics have been proposed in the literature [2, 4, 9, 8]:
• Robustness allows the system to absorb and withstand the impacts associated with a disruptive event. A system
with a high degree of robustness will maintain the bulk of functional performance, over time, in the presence of
disruptive events.
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Fig. 1. Resilience of an Infrastructure System for a
KPI
Fig. 2. Need for Resilience based on Infrastructure
Role
• Response Time characterizes the timeliness of response after the initial impact of a disruptive event. Systems
with a short response time are better able to mitigate the impacts, reducing the attenuation imposed by the
disruptive event.
• Recovery Time characterizes how well suited the system is to recover from a disruptive event. Systems with a
short recovery time return to base functional performance in a more timely fashion.
• Performance Attenuation describes the net reduction in performance that a system experiences as a result of a
disruptive event.
• Level of Recovery describes how well a system recovers from a disruptive event, relative to base performance.
• Performance Loss represents the loss in total performance of the system throughout all stages of response and
recovery. This is measured by the diﬀerence in areas under the unaﬀected and disrupted KPI curves, and is
represented by the shaded region in Figure 1.
• Adaptability characterizes how the system is able to respond to changes and recover functional performance in
the face of disruptive events.
• Redundancy describes the ability of other systems to perform the same functions when the system experiences
loss of a system component.
• Agility describes the means by which the system manages the response to an event, and the ability of the system
to respond appropriately to new events when encountered.
Infrastructure segments that provide services which address the basic needs of the served population are
those in which resilience is most important. This is similar to the individual satisfying Maslow’s hierarchy
of needs. Incorporation of key resilience attributes into the infrastructure increases correspondingly with
the need for greater resilience for infrastructure that provides basic services. Figure 2 captures this concept
pictorially.
2.1. A Fuzzy Approach for Assessing Architecture Resilience
Important functional, logical and operational interdependencies are often overlooked by existing mod-
eling approaches [10, 11]. The functional relationships and logical dependencies that are woven throughout
these systems dictate how well each segment can perform, and the degree to which services are rendered for
other infrastructure segments. The functions performed diﬀer from one infrastructure segment to another,
and the degree of interdependency also varies across segments. Figure 3 depicts functional relationships
between an example infrastructure subset. Diﬃculties arise in modeling these complex interdependencies
because the relationships that exist between each subsystem are often fuzzy, ambiguous and require subject
matter experts to ascertain the conditions that frame the interdependency relationships within the operating
environment.
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Fig. 3. Interdependent Functional Relationship Between Infrastructure Subsystems
An approach that builds on previous work by [5, 12, 13, 10, 14, 15] accommodates ambiguity and
estimates infrastructure architecture resilience using fuzzy logic. The approach is a two-step process:
1. Identify infrastructure segments where resilience is a priority architecture attribute using expert judge-
ment for functional, logical and operational interdependencies in concert with inoperability input-
output modeling (IIM), dynamic IIM, or other existing interdependency analysis methods
2. Assess infrastructure architecture resilience using a fuzzy rule set tailored to the speciﬁc resilience
metrics and characteristics most appropriate to the infrastructure architecture under consideration
Several methods have been developed to forecast the impacts of a disruptive event using information
about the system and interactions and interdependencies present throughout the system. Using the results
from the IIM, infrastructure segments can be prioritized based on the dependencies that exist across the in-
frastructure system. This methodology does not require any changes to the inoperability modeling method-
ology selected from among [12], [13] or [10].
Infrastructure operates on the balanced management of resources (assets, materials, money) and infor-
mation (command and control, data). These operational characteristics can be examined to uncover existing
functional, logical and operational relationships. This knowledge can be used to help identify the driving
infrastructure segments based on established resource and information transaction relationships that exist
between infrastructure segments. These interdependency relationships, along with the relationships derived
from interdependency modeling, can be used to prioritize infrastructure segments. The prioritized segments
can then be used to derive the most appropriate infrastructure resilience attributes based upon a charac-
terization of existing infrastructure. The identiﬁed resilience attributes can then be measured and evaluated
using a fuzzy rule set to ascertain the contribution of each infrastructure segment to overall system resilience
in order to identify architecture modiﬁcations that will bolster system resilience. These modiﬁcations can
be made such that the system as a whole performs as best as reasonably possible when a disruptive event
occurs.
The results of this approach to architecture resilience estimation allow infrastructure operators to assess
the relative performance of the infrastructure segment against relevant resilience metrics. The approach also
enables system architects to assess infrastructure architectures through an understanding of the interdepen-
dencies inherent in the emergent infrastructure system that result in cascading inoperability of interdepen-
dent infrastructure segments. This approach builds upon the functional relationships identiﬁed in [13] and
depicted in Figure 3.
2.2. Application of the Fuzzy Architecture Assessment
Alternative methods have been proposed to identify key infrastructure segments through the expected
impacts resulting from a disruptive event [12, 13, 10]. The results of these approaches are used to prioritize
the identiﬁcation of, and investment in, more resilient architecture alternatives that better support the services
provided by these systems in the face of disruptive events. Here, it is assumed that the infrastructure segment
has been identiﬁed using the IIM and through expert elicitation, resulting in two alternative architectures
selected for fuzzy assessment of resilience. A thorough description of the IIM is provided in [12].
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Fig. 4. Membership Functions for Adaptability, Redundancy and Resilience
With identiﬁed architectures for the infrastructure segment, system resilience attributes appropriate to
the identiﬁed infrastructure segment can be used to assess the relative performance of the infrastructure
segment against the disruptive event. For example, redundancy can be measured by the number of alter-
native systems that perform the system function, accounting for systems that can be degraded similarly to
the system under consideration. For energy infrastructure, this may include the use of generators for power
generation; for communication, alternative communication mechanisms for information systems may be
identiﬁed as redundant. Recovery rate may be characterized as a function of the available resources from
external sources to provide recovery capability, and which have not been previously committed to other
aspects of the recovery eﬀort. Adaptability may be evaluated through operational characteristics, such as
cross-training of operator functions or the suitability of one component to perform the function of other
components. This approach requires the deﬁnition of resilience attributes and the mapping of fuzzy mem-
bership functions to each attribute. These attributes can be ascribed by operators and subject matter experts
by clearly deﬁning the relationships that exist across the infrastructure within the contexts of the performed
functions. Resilience attributes of adaptability and redundancy are considered for the example architecture
assessment. Table 2 contains a set of evaluated attributes for two competing infrastructure architectures.
Table 2. Fuzzy Inputs for Architecture Alternatives
Architecture Alternative Adaptability Redundancy
Architecture 1 80 60
Architecture 2 60 75
A fuzzy approach accommodates ambiguity in the assessment of key system attributes, and brings to-
gether diﬀerent measurement scales to provide a combined outcome. For the architecture assessment, these
diﬀerences are implemented by diﬀerentiating the fuzzy membership functions associated with the resilience
attributes that are key to each infrastructure segment. For this example, we assume that the resilience at-
tributes adaptability and robustness are most important, have equivalent input variable terms, and, hence,
have equivalent membership functions. For simplicity, resilience is considered to have the same distribution.
Figure 4 depicts the membership functions used for each linguistic variable.
The applicability of resilience characteristics to infrastructure segments result from properties of the
infrastructure segment. For example, increased redundancy may be less important in a segment that already
has several mechanisms for performing a single function, whereas decreased response time can be crucial
for a system that lacks the capacity or capability to respond to minor disruptions. These nuances are con-
structed through fuzzy rules. The following fuzzy propositions comprise the fuzzy rule base for the example:
IF adaptability is moderate AND robustness is high THEN resilience is moderate
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IF adaptability is high AND robustness is moderate THEN resilience is high
IF adaptability is moderate AND robustness is moderate THEN resilience is low
IF adaptability is high AND robustness is high THEN resilience is high
For defuzziﬁcation, each satisﬁed antecedent block is evaluated and produces the membership for the
resilience consequent. The degree of membership for each fuzzy resilience set is evaluated using the mean
of maximum defuzziﬁcation rule. This results in resilience output of 78 for Architecture 1 and a resilience
output of 50 for Architecture 2. Given these inputs and fuzzy rules, Architecture 1 is a more resilient
alternative than Architecture 2 and would be pursued.
3. Conclusion
The recognition that infrastructure is increasingly interdependent and vulnerable to cascading perfor-
mance degradation resulting from disruptive events has contributed to the growing interest in resilient sys-
tems. This recognition, along with the need to understand the associated contexts, relationships and en-
vironments of complex systems for which resilience applies, contributes to the need for resilient system
architectures.
In order for an approach to be widely accepted by end users, it must be understandable and relevant to
stakeholder needs. Resilience is but one factor in systems architecting. Systems architects must weave to-
gether solutions from a number of important criteria to develop a viable system. Complex systems are often
constructed to address changing needs, and are largely developed in an ad hoc manner, further complicating
the eﬀorts of the systems architect.
Leveraging the understanding of the operator for infrastructure segments, and using existing method-
ologies to prioritize identiﬁcation and investment in resilience, assist the systems architect in engineering
resilience into the infrastructure system. This approach allows the subject matter expert to help deﬁne the
important criteria that are used to evaluate the resilience of an infrastructure segment. Using fuzzy logic,
these attributes can be combined to assess the overall resilience of the system, and assist in identiﬁcation of
speciﬁc actions to bolster system resilience.
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